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The Programmatic Message of the "Kings and Singers" Passage: Hesiod, *Theogony* 80–103

KATHRYN B. STODDARD
The Florida State University

SUMMARY: In Hesiod's *Theogony*, the "Kings and Singers" passage, lines 80–103, parallels the poem's *Dichterweihe*, lines 22–34, in that both portray contact between the Muses and mortals on whom they bestow gifts. The gifts granted Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe*, a divine voice and a laurel scepter, represent the persuasive powers of ἀοιδός and βασιλεύς as described in *Th.* 80–103. The latter passage is thus programmatic for how Hesiod perceives his role as narrator and how he intends to use the Muses' gifts for didaxis. The Prometheus and Hekate passages later in the poem show Hesiod's didaxis in action.

1. INTRODUCTION

NEAR THE END OF THE PROEM TO THE *Theogony*, between the famous *Dichterweihe* scene in which Hesiod receives a laurel scepter and a divine voice from the Muses, and the transition to the main body of the *Theogony*, Hesiod describes how the Muses inspire "kings" (βασιλῆες; on the meaning of this term see section 3 below) and singers (ἀοιδοί). Although the remarkable statement on poetics in lines 80–103 occurs in the proem of the *Theogony*—itself a poem in which the narrator several times mentions his narrative role—the self-referential nature and programmatic significance of the "Kings and Singers" passage has not yet been fully explored.[1] In this paper I shall argue that Hesiod uses this passage, in conjunction with the *Dichterweihe* scene, to describe his own role in the poem.

[1] Not only does the narrator give himself a name in this poem (22 Ἡσίοδον), he even participates in the action of the poem (24–34). Other explicit references to the narrator's role occur in line 1 (ἀρχώμεθ'), 35 (μοι), 36 (ἀρχώμεθα), and, in the *Theogony* proper, at 369–70 (τῶν ὄνομ' ἀργαλέον πάντων βροτὸν ἄνδρα ἐνισπεῖν / οἱ δὲ ἕκαστοι ἴσασιν, ὅσοι περιναιετάουσι). The amount of self-reference in the *Theogony* is, of course,

The "Kings and Singers" passage (80–103) follows the description of the Muses' song on Olympus (36–76) and is joined to it by a catalogue of the Muses' names (77–79):

ταῦτ' ἄρα Μοῦσαι ἄειδον Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
ἐννέα θυγατέρες μεγάλου Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖαι,
Κλειώ τ' Εὐτέρπη τε Θάλειά τε Μελπομένη τε
Τερψιχόρη τ' Ἐρατώ τε Πολύμνιά τ' Οὐρανίη τε
Καλλιόπη θ'· ἡ δὲ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἁπασέων.
ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.
ὅντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο
γεινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,
τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἐέρσην,
τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα· οἱ δέ νυ λαοὶ
πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας
ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
αἶψά τι καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσε·
τοὔνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὔνεκα λαοῖς
βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῇφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι
ῥηιδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν·
ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὡς ἱλάσκονται
αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισι.
τοίη Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν.
ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί,
ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες· ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὅντινα Μοῦσαι
φίλωνται· γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή.
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδέι θυμῷ
ἄζηται κραδίην ἀκαχήμενος, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὸς
Μουσάων θεράπων κλεῖα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων
ὑμνήσει μάκαράς τε θεοὺς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν,
αἶψ' ὅ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ τι κηδέων
μέμνηται· ταχέως δὲ παρέτραπε δῶρα θεάων.[2]

dwarfed by that in the *Works and Days*, but this is due to the fact that the narrator of the latter poem is internal, dramatized, and overt, i.e., he plays a role in the story he is narrating. For the largely external and covert narrator of the *Theogony* to refer explicitly to his narrative role, however, runs counter to the tendencies of the Homeric narrator and offers striking evidence of Hesiod's self-consciousness. For the terms "internal/external" and "covert/overt" as applied to narrators see de Jong 2001: 5; for the self-consciousness of the Homeric narrator see de Jong 1987: 42 and 2001: 6.

[2] The text cited is that of West.

These things the Muses who have Olympian homes were singing,
nine daughters born of great Zeus,
Kleio and Euterpe and Thaleia and Melpomene
and Terpsichore and Erato and Polymnia and Ourania
and Kalliope, but she is preeminent among them all.
For she also attends reverence-inspiring kings.
Whomever of Zeus-nurtured kings the daughters of great Zeus honor
and look upon at birth,
for him they drop sweet dew upon his tongue,
and his words flow sweet from his mouth. And the people, in turn,
all look upon him judging claims
with straight judgments. And he, speaking steadfastly,
quickly resolves even a great quarrel expertly.
For this reason kings are reputed wise, because for people
who have been wronged[3] in their dealings they accomplish restitution
easily, bending them with soft words.
And they honor him like a god when he comes into the assembly,
with honey-sweet reverence, and he stands out among the assembled.
Such is the holy gift of the Muses to mankind.
For from the Muses and far-shooting Apollo
are singers upon the earth and lyre-players,
but from Zeus are kings. And he is blessed, whomever the Muses
love; a sweet voice flows from his mouth.
For if anyone, possessing grief in his fresh-pained soul,
is withered by the grieving in his heart, yet if the singer,
servant of the Muses, will sing the glories of the men of old
and the blessed gods who hold Olympus,
he quickly forgets his sorrows, nor remembers
anything of his griefs; but swiftly the gifts of the goddesses turn him.

After concluding the Muses' Olympian song (75 ταῦτ' ἄρα Μοῦσαι ἄειδον) the narrator names the nine Muses (77–79) and moves into the passage under consideration here (80–103) with the observation that Kalliope, last named of the nine, is "preeminent" (79 προφερεστάτη) among the Muses. This adjective is explained in the following line with a reference to her attendance upon "kings" (80 ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ), and the rest of the "Kings and Singers" passage follows naturally from this comment.

The transition from the Muse-catalogue to the "Kings and Singers" passage is in fact so smooth that some scholars regard the entire passage as a transitional device designed to transfer the narrative focus from the description of the Muses' activities to the poet's final invocation of the goddesses at the

[3] Translation of βλαπτομένοις suggested by West ad loc.

end of the proem (104–15).[4] Other scholars, giving the passage more of the intense scrutiny that its length and placement demand, have proposed various explanations of its content.

West, staunchly biographical as always in his approach to Hesiod's poetry, follows van Groningen in arguing that the passage refers to the putative historical occasion of the first performance of the *Theogony*, namely, the funeral games of King Amphidamas of Khalkis. The flattering references to kings and the allusions to the singer's power to allay the grief of his listeners in this section then represent Hesiod's attempt to ingratiate himself with the grieving sons of the deceased king, with a view to winning the poetry contest at hand.[5] Since, however, the biographical details here are unverifiable, this approach seems of limited use in interpreting the text.

Scholars have also analyzed the "Kings and Singers" passage with attention to the role it plays in the development of a Hesiodic world view, especially with regard to the poet's ideas about justice and political administration. Havelock believes that Hesiod's linking of poets with kings is based upon the king's need to have poets record his decrees in verse (1963: 108–9). Expanding on this idea, Roth argues that Hesiod mentions kings in connection with the Muses because of an ancient association between the Muses as daughters of Mnemosyne and the oral nature of the laws that the judge-kings of Hesiod's time had to memorize.[6] Duban supports the "political" interpretation of the passage offered by Havelock and Roth, arguing that "Hesiod … is but further sanctioning an already traditional relationship between poet and

[4] Referring to "the long description of the Muses' relationship to kings and poets" as a "preparation" for the next ten lines of the proem, Hamilton (14) briefly sums up his view of the "Kings and Singers" passage thus: "Delight has replaced deceit, and the focus is not now on the Muses but on the performance of the poet. The transition to the poet invoking the Muses to sing the race of gods could not be made easier." Solmsen (7) and Havelock (111) make the point that Kalliope's name, through its connection to the voice, helps Hesiod make the transition from the catalogue of the Muses' names to the discussion of eloquence in the "Kings and Singers" passage. Cf. Duban 10–11.

[5] West 44, van Groningen 260. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf had argued previously (477) that the remarks about kings in this section indicated that kings formed part of the audience and that Hesiod was interested in courting their favor.

[6] "The Muse who knows Catalogues of Ships and plots of stories seems to be a personification of the oral tradition, which preserves the people's knowledge. As such she could also remember the oral laws. A judge as well as a poet might invoke her to aid his memory" (Roth 338). Roth's arguments are flawed, in my opinion, by her failure to note the importance of persuasion in the passage, ascribing it to what she deems a "misinterpretation" on Hesiod's part: "Hesiod himself, however, seems not to have understood the relationship between kings and Muses, and so has reinterpreted it as the gift of persuasive eloquence" (338).

king by bringing them both under the Muses', and especially Kalliope's, protection" (1980: 11). The link between kings and poets resides in the fact that the Muses make it possible for the βασιλεύς to make "unerring pronouncements" and maintain political stability (19).[7]

Reacting to the arguments of Roth, who sees the link between βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί as consisting of memory, as well as to those of scholars who view the βασιλῆες of the *Theogony* as fundamentally different from the ἀοιδοί, Gagarin points out (65) that Hesiod deliberately makes the two similar: "The text itself … provides no grounds for treating the description of the *basileus*' speech act any differently from that of the poet." Gagarin argues, rightly in my opinion, that the passage should be analyzed in terms of the rhetorical skill, possessed by βασιλεύς and ἀοιδός alike, that allows them to bend the minds of their hearers into more productive paths (63). That is, the passage's programmatic value for the poem must reflect the parallel that Hesiod draws between βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί via the Muses' common gift of eloquence, and the statements about the effect of the eloquence of βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί, so prominent by virtue of their placement in the proem, reveal how Hesiod wishes us to react to his poetry (and to himself as narrator). Gagarin's argument represents an improvement upon both the biographical approach of West and the (equally speculative) socio-political assumptions of Roth and Duban, and it is his approach that I seek to develop further in this article.

2. STRUCTURE: HEAVEN AND EARTH

An important step in eliciting the programmatic message of the "Kings and Singers" passage is recognizing the fact that it repeats and expands upon themes that first occur in the obviously programmatic *Dichterweihe* passage (lines 22–34). I argue elsewhere that a principal theme in the *Dichterweihe* is the distance separating gods from men, a distance reinforced by both the formal structure of that scene and by the unusually insulting address of the Muses to their favored poet in it (26–28).[8] Hesiod's importance as a poetic "bridge" between the divine and mortal realms is made the more explicit in the *Dichterweihe* by its emphasis on the lowliness of mankind, and throughout the poem via the narrator's human orientation in telling of divine events. A key element in Hesiod's role as the human mediator between divine and mortal realms is his αὐδὴ θέσπις, the gift the Muses grant him in lines 31–

[7] For other interpretations of this section see Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 474–79, Sperduti 228–33, Solmsen, Maehler 44–46, Combellack 1974, Thalmann 139–40, Gagarin, Kirby, and Laks.

[8] Stoddard.

32. As Ford astutely remarks," … if *audê* is normally the human voice, *thespis audê,* 'divine human voice,' approaches oxymoron."[9] One can take his point further and observe that the unusual enjambment here—αὐδὴν / θέσπιν—represents the normal separation of the two concepts and hence highlights their striking combination in the person of the singer: only the inspired poet possesses a human αὐδή that is divinely θέσπις.[10] The lines that follow the *Dichterweihe*, a description of the Muses' song on Olympus with emphasis on the goddesses' ability to give pleasure to their (divine) listeners,[11] have their earthly counterpart in the "Kings and Singers" passage, which emphasizes the pleasurable effect of the eloquence granted by the Muses to βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί. In these two parts of the proem, then, the persuasive eloquence of the Muses is presented in both its divine and its mortal manifestations, on Olympus and on earth.

The duplication consequent upon the gulf between Olympus and earth is also evident in the structure of the first part of the proem, where the song of the Muses praising the divine status quo (11–22)[12] is followed by a passage that firmly emphasizes the inferior place of humanity relative to the gods (26–28). That is, the first part of the proem (1–36) consists of the Muses' song (representing the present state of the divine order) followed by the description (in the dramatic setting of the *Dichterweihe*) of the present state of humans, while the second part (37–103) contains a description of the effect of the Muses' song on Olympus followed by a passage describing the Muses' δόσις in the human sphere (the "Kings and Singers" passage). Furthermore, the proem's two references to mankind, in addition to articulating the structure, as we have just seen, also have a thematic connection.

3. THEME: THE ROLE OF THE POET

In the *Dichterweihe* Hesiod receives two gifts from the Muses: an αὐδὴ θέσπις (31–32) and a laurel σκῆπτρον (30). Hesiod's αὐδή has been discussed briefly and will receive more attention below. But first, the scepter.

[9] Ford 173. See also Clay 1974: 129–36, arguing that αὐδή denotes a specifically *human* voice.

[10] Ford 180. For more on θέσπις see n. 18 below.

[11] Unlike the report of the Muses' first song, which stresses content (11–21), the description here focuses on reception in Olympus: 37 τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον, 39–40 τῶν δ' ἀκάματος ῥέει αὐδὴ / ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεῖα, 40 γελᾷ δέ τε δώματα πατρός, 51 τέρπουσι Διὸς νόον. The Muses' power to give pleasure to listeners is stressed again later in the proem: 65 ἐρατὴν δὲ διὰ στόμα ὄσσαν ἰεῖσαι, 67 ἐπήρατον ὄσσαν ἰεῖσαι, 69–70 περὶ δ' ἴαχε γαῖα μέλαινα / ὑμνεύσαις, ἐρατὸς δὲ ποδῶν ὕπο δοῦπος ὀρώρει.

[12] For the "reverse order" of the Muses' first song see Hamilton 12–14 and Clay 1988: 326.

The nature of the scepter given to Hesiod has long been a matter of debate. West, following an ancient tradition preserved in Pausanias (9.30.3), believes it to be that of the rhapsode, and maintains that it was intended to signify that Hesiod could not play the lyre.[13] As Nagy following Østerud and others points out, however, this identification misses the point. Nagy succinctly summarizes the uses of the scepter as revealed in archaic poetry:

> The *skeptron* is a staff held by kings (*Iliad* 1.279, 2.86), by Chryses as priest of Apollo (*Iliad* 1.15, 28), by Teiresias as prophet (*Odyssey* 9.90), by *kerukes* 'heralds' (*Iliad* 7.277), or generally by one who stands up to speak in the *agora* 'assembly' (*Iliad* 3.218, 23.568).[14]

He concludes (53) that the model for Hesiod's scepter is the scepter of the elders depicted on the Shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.497), who wait their turn to hold the scepter and utter their judgments. Thus in his view Hesiod's scepter indicates a man who utters δίκη and other forms of authoritative speech. Kirby agrees, noting that the scepter represents "the rhetorical *warrant* for Hesiod's subsequent utterance," and that its possession indicates that he is "entitled to address members of his *polis* in formal civic discourse, and to have them pay attention to what he says."[15] The scepter thus represents not so much a badge of office as the authority to speak and be heard. By representing the Muses as giving him the scepter, Hesiod clearly adopts the role of βασιλεύς as well as ἀοιδός in this scene.

A general misunderstanding of the dual role that Hesiod attributes to himself in this passage has arisen from confusion over the term βασιλεύς. As Gagarin notes (63),

> … [E]ven though everyone recognizes that for Hesiod *basileus* does not designate a 'king' in the sense of an absolute monarch with full executive powers, scholars continue to use this translation. This immediately makes one think of all the various duties and functions of a king, whereas the role of the *basilêes* or

[13] West *ad* 30. West provides the other ancient sources for the idea of Hesiod-as-rhapsode.

[14] Nagy 52. Cf. also West ad loc., who makes a similar observation. Østerud states that the question of whether the scepter was an indicator of Hesiod's lack of lyre-playing ability is "preposterous." He continues (27), "Surely the staff is chosen because it is the symbol of 'power-possessing' persons and so anticipates the association of poets with kings in 80–103. In other words we may perhaps regard the staff as emblematic of the civilizing and educational duties which are imposed on poets as well as kings."

[15] Kirby 41. See also Combellack, who argues (1948: 215) that the scepter in Homer is used to denote an utterance of "special significance and solemnity," and Svenbro, who finds (127) that the scepter of Agamemnon "symbolise le pouvoir royal exceptionnel."

> 'lords' in Hesiod's society is much more restricted … . There is no indication, in other words, that in Hesiod's time the *basilêes* have any other public function than that of judging.

If we interpret, with Svenbro, the laurel scepter as an emblem of royal prerogative, it becomes difficult to understand how Hesiod, who has just been emphasizing the lowliness of his status in 26–28, could presume to appropriate such an exalted symbol for himself. If, however, we regard the scepter not as the symbol of supreme authority but as the gavel of a judge, we can better understand the role that Hesiod assigns to himself: the Muses have bestowed upon him not only the "divine voice" of an inspired poet, but the authority—in particular, as we shall see, the conflict-resolving capacity—of a judge.[16]

What, then, of the other gift to Hesiod? The αὐδὴ θέσπις is granted to him for the purpose of "bringing glory to the things that will be and were before" (32 ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα), i.e., divine matters.[17] Through the use of his "godlike voice" the poet will glorify (κλείω) the divine events of the *Theogony*.[18] If he is not merely to recount these events but to glorify them, it follows that the αὐδὴ θέσπις must possess the quality of persuasive eloquence, for in order to make a thing appear glorious one must convince others that it is so. In other words, κλέος (cognate with κλύω and meaning "that which is heard") is dependent upon the perception of others: glory only exists as a reaction of others to a deed or account thereof which is brought to their attention. Thus if Hesiod is granted the αὐδὴ θέσπις to glorify the actions of the gods, this "divine voice" must be divine particularly in terms of its ability to move and give pleasure to listeners.

[16] Nagy 53: "In sum, the *skeptron* given to Hesiod by the Muses indicates that he will speak with the authority of a king."

[17] Clay (1988: 330) suggests that what the Muses instruct Hesiod to sing (32 τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα "the things that will be and were before") differs from what they themselves sing on Olympus (38 τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα "the things that are and the things that will be and were before"). She considers (correctly, in my opinion) the content of Hesiod's song to be "eternal things," and the content of the Muses' song to be "both mortal *and* eternal things."

[18] Ford 180 observes that Hesiod restricts the use of αὐδὴ θέσπις to poets, using the term ἔπεα "words" (*Th.* 84) when referring to the non-poetic eloquence of kings. Even given a specialized meaning for αὐδὴ θέσπις, however, it is likely that Hesiod intends us to compare the king's Muse-granted eloquence with the poet's Muse-granted "divine voice." Koller argues unconvincingly (277–80) that θέσπις originally meant "prophetic." Sellschopp believes (48) that θέσπις here means "divine" in the sense that the Muses have literally given Hesiod their voice, "denn er singt ja dasselbe wie sie." Verdenius, however, objects to this reading, on the grounds (238) that "θέσπις does not denote something divine but something coming from the gods."

If the σκῆπτρον of line 30 signifies "authority to speak in judgment" and the αὐδὴ θέσπις of 31–32 a "voice with godlike powers of persuasion," the association of βασιλῆες[19] with ἀοιδοί so prominent in the "Kings and Singers" passage is already established in the *Dichterweihe,* and this association is embodied in the person of the narrator himself. In effect, Hesiod claims for himself by this association the right to compose *authoritative poetry,* a song that not only pleases, but also persuades (or instructs; see section 5 below) its audience.

Of course where the *Dichterweihe* has one recipient, Hesiod, for two gifts, the "Kings and Singers" passage seems to have one gift, eloquence, for two recipients, a βασιλεύς (lines 80–92) and an ἀοιδός (95–103). But verbal echoes and situational parallels reveal an equivalence between the two recipients. Both ἀοιδός and βασιλεύς are held in *esteem* by the goddesses (81 τιμήσουσι, 97 φίλωνται), who grant them *sweet voices* (83 ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερὴν . . . ἐέρσην, 97 γλυκερὴ . . . αὐδή) which *flow* or *flow sweetly* (84 ῥεῖ μείλιχα, 97 γλυκερὴ . . . ῥέει). Both singer and king receive *gifts* from the Muses (93 δόσις, 103 δῶρα), by means of which each can resolve an *unpleasant situation* (87 μέγα νεῖκος, 98–99 πένθος ἔχων . . . κραδίην ἀκαχήμενος) *quickly* (87 αἶψα, 102–3 αἶψ' . . . ταχέως) by *diverting* the minds of his listeners (90 παραιφάμενοι, 103 παρέτραπε).[20] Furthermore, just as κλέος (which, as I argue above, only exists if the poet can convince his hearers that a deed is glorious) arises as a reaction of the audience to a poet's voice, δίκη can be said to arise as a reaction of the litigants to the king's voice. That is to say, justice is not justice unless people recognize it as such. Hence both poet and king use their persuasive voices to manifest an attribute of a god among men: ἀοιδοί use their Muse-granted eloquence to bring κλέος from the Muses in the form of song, while βασιλῆες use their Muse-granted eloquence to bring δίκη from Zeus in the form of "straight judgments" (85). Thus the language of the two halves of the "Kings and Singers" passage emphatically links βασιλῆες to ἀοιδοί by means of their relationship to the Muses, their persuasive eloquence, and the effect that their voices have upon the listener.

[19] Although I agree with Gagarin in that I interpret the *function* of the βασιλεύς in this poem to be primarily judicial, I do not think that it is necessary to use the translation "judge" in rendering βασιλεύς. The Queen of England today is still called a "Queen" despite the great difference between the English monarch's present and former power. Scholars must simply bear in mind that a "king" in Hesiod's day had different duties than one in Agamemnon's.

[20] These parallels are all noted by Gagarin 64, Maehler 44–45, Verdenius 257, and Duban 13. Several of them are also mentioned by Fränkel 150, Detienne 49–51, Puelma 94 n. 38, and Pucci 18.

Although Hesiod thus links the βασιλεύς of 80–92 to the ἀοιδός of 95–103 by means of these striking verbal and situational parallels, the γάρ-clause that introduces the section on singers is, as scholars have long noted, not at all smooth.[21] It has been suggested to me that the abruptness of γάρ in line 94 might be ameliorated by the following paraphrase of lines 93–96: "*Such is the gift of the Muses to men (who are kings). For singers come from the Muses and Apollo, and kings come from Zeus (the father of the Muses and Apollo*)."[22] Even this interpretation, however, involves a rather abrupt change of topic. That is, if we take the ἀνθρώποισιν of 93 to refer only to kings instead of to humans generally, the transition from 93 to 94 seems illogical: "Such is the gift of the Muses to βασιλῆες. For singers come from the Muses and Apollo, while βασιλῆες come from their father, Zeus." If 93 refers to what the Muses give to βασιλῆες in particular, by what logical process does Hesiod then revert to the idea that βασιλῆες are *less* closely connected to the Muses than singers are? It seems to make more sense to take the τοίη of 93 to point ahead to 94–103 rather than as summarizing 80–92, as West, for example, takes it.[23] The ἀνθρώποισιν of line 93 can then be taken as referring to the human race generally, and the γάρ of 94 as a response to the τοίη of 93. The τοίη (and its "answering" γάρ-clause) then introduce 95–103, in which kings and singers, who collectively represent the gift-receiving ἄνθρωποι of 93, are treated together as the recipients of divine eloquence: "Of such a sort (as I am now going to relate) is the gift of the Muses to mankind. For while singers are from the Muses, βασιλῆες come from Zeus." This paraphrase does not remove the abruptness of the transition from 93 to 94, but perhaps Hesiod intended it to

[21] As with the transition from the Muse-catalogue to the beginning of the "Kings and Singers" passage, lines 79–80, the movement from one train of thought to another in this passage is somewhat abruptly accomplished by means of an explanatory γάρ-clause. The second γάρ of the Kings and Singers passage (94) is less abrupt than the first (80), but both introduce new subjects with little warning.

[22] This paraphrase, offered by an anonymous referee for *TAPA*, differs slightly from that provided by West *ad* 94–97: "The Muses bestow all these benefits upon a king (93). For (*although*) singers are from the Muses, and kings are (not from the Muses but) from Zeus: *nevertheless* the Muses' favour is always beneficial (even to a king), *and* the words flow sweet from the recipient's lips" (emphasis mine). I do not find adequate justification in the text for West's insertion of "although" and "and," so I do not agree with his rendering of δ' as "nevertheless."

[23] West ad loc. The three other uses of pronominal τοῖος in *Th.* all refer to what precedes rather than to what follows (615, 703, 805). It seems not unlikely that Hesiod intends the listener to assume at first that the τοίη of line 93 has a preceding referent, only to reinterpret it in light of the following lines. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

be abrupt: βασιλῆες are like ἀοιδοί with respect to their persuasive ability, but they are not quite identical. The difference lies in what the ἀοιδός and the βασιλεύς *bring about* or *manifest* by means of their eloquence.

4. THE GODDESSES' GIFTS

As scholars have long noted, the "persuasive" power ascribed by Hesiod to both poets and kings constitutes the power to "deflect" the mind of the listener or even deceive it by causing it to forget its present troubles, whether emotional or litigious.[24] Surprisingly, however, the formula by which Hesiod indicates the power of the Muses to induce forgetfulness, 102–3 ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ .../ μέμνηται, is a reversal of that used elsewhere by hymn poets to describe their performance, as in the first line of the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo*: μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο. Indeed, it seems as if Hesiod is deliberately saying something paradoxical about the Muses' function relative to "memory" both here and in lines 53–55, in both of which passages he implies that the Muses, while representing "memory," also grant "forgetfulness" of evils.[25] In fact, the Muses are not only the paradoxical givers of both memory and forgetfulness, but they actually employ "memory" in the form of song to cause this forgetfulness. As Bakker argues convincingly for the *Hymn to Apollo,* when an archaic poet sings "I shall remember" a god, he refers not to memory as we know it, a process by which we "retrieve" knowledge that our minds stored *in the past,* but rather to his poetic reenactment *in the present* of the events that he is relating.[26] For the archaic Greek poet, as well as for the Homeric warrior who "remembers" battle, "[r]emembering an event from the past is bringing it to the mind's eye, seeing it, and describing it as if it were happening before one's eyes."[27]

[24] Solmsen 7, Pucci 17–29, Lamberton 68.

[25] 53–55 τὰς (*sc.* Μούσας) ...τέκε ... / Μνημοσύνη ... /λησμοσύνην τε κακῶν ἄμπαυμά τε μερμηράων. See Pucci 22–24 and Duban 17. Pucci notes, with West ad loc., that the juxtaposition of Μνημοσύνη and λησμοσύνην at the beginnings of lines 54–55 is "conscious and purposeful." Pucci focuses on the contradictory nature of the images in the "Kings and Singers" passage as well, observing (18) the contradiction implicit in the "straight" speech of the good kings, which "leads astray" the minds of the people it persuades. The speech of poets is similarly paradoxical: "For, like honey, the poetic *logos* implies at once the contradictory presence of divine truth and the simulation of truth, the straightness of discourse that goes directly to 'things as they are' and the deflecting, intoxicating power of the word" (19).

[26] Bakker 2002: 67–69.

[27] Bakker 2002: 74. For examples of warriors "remembering" battle, Bakker (2002: 70 n. 11) cites *Il.* 6.112, 8.174, 11.287, 13.48, 15.477, 15.487, 15.734, 16.270, 17.103, 17.185, and 19.148. For more on ἐνάργεια in Homer see Bakker 2001 and 1999.

This process of "poetic reenactment," or ἐνάργεια, is precisely what Hesiod means when he states that the Muses bring "forgetfulness of evils" by their song, and when he describes the gifts of the Muses to βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί in terms of persuasive ability. The Muses grant poets the ability to make events seem to happen again before the eyes of the audience, hence these events are "persuasive," i.e., they appear real and make the hearer forget about everything else for as long as the song lasts. Similarly, when a Muse-blessed βασιλεύς speaks to the litigants of a court case, he, too, employs ἐνάργεια: he makes the path of justice "appear," in a sense, before the eyes of his listeners by persuading the aggrieved party to accept a settlement. The persuasive power of the βασιλεύς is such that he can divert the angry minds of furious contestants into paths of justice, and can do this "easily" (90 ῥηιδίως). His ἐνάργεια is similar to the poet's in that it easily makes what the speaker utters seem more valid than the private concerns that currently engross the listener, but the two types of persuasive speech are not the same. "For singers and lyre-players," Hesiod tells us, "are from the Muses and far-shooting Apollo," whereas "βασιλῆες are from Zeus" (94–96): what βασιλῆες "reenact" through their persuasive (i.e., enargeic) speech is not the τέρψις of song but the δίκη of Zeus.[28]

Because the Muse-blessed poet, like the poet of the *Hymn to Apollo,* "remembers and does not forget" the matter of his song, the listener "forgets and does not remember" his sorrows (102–3). The poet, through the gift of the Muses, has the power to make divine ἀληθέα more present to the listener than the mundane ἔτυμα that surround his daily existence (27–28). Similarly the βασιλεύς, if he is beloved by the Muses, has the power to make the just course more vivid, more *present* to the eyes of the litigants than the courses of narrow self-interest that brought them into conflict in the first place. Thus through the mediating function of the Muses, who allow the "divine human voice" (Ford's "oxymoronic" αὐδὴ θέσπις) to become divinely persuasive via ἐνάργεια, the poet can accomplish upon earth the presence of Apollo, or poetry/music; and the βασιλεύς can accomplish the presence of Zeus, or jus-

[28] Cf. Brillante, who finds in the "Kings and Singers" passage a statement that the Muses guarantee the truth of the words spoken under their influence. For ἀοιδοί, this means that the Muses enable their words to embody poetic truth (18): "Nel poeta ispirato l'efficacia della parola trova riscontro nella 'verita' degli eventi narrati (cosmogonia, genealogie eroiche e divine) e in genere nell'attendibilità dei contenuti (poesia gnomica e didascalica)." For βασιλῆες, it means that their words are "true" in that they embody the justice of Zeus (18–19): "Nel caso de re l'efficacia della parola si esercita nei giudizi che essi sono chiamati a pronunciare … . Ristabilendo un equilibrio turbato dall'offesa, i re contribuiscono a realizzare quella giustizia divina che regola il cosmo."

tice.[29] Both the poet's αὐδὴ θέσπις, which allows him to sing of divine or otherwise unknowable events, and the scepter of the βασιλεύς, which grants him the right to be heard when passing judgment, are intimately connected with the enargeic power of speech, that is, with the "mind-bending" power of the Muses; the difference between them lies in what this persuasive capability can bring about.

The gifts that the Muses give Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe,* the laurel scepter and the divine voice, thus anticipate and help to explain the association, made in lines 80–103, between kings and singers as beneficiaries of the Muses. In effect, what Hesiod has done in these two passages of the proem of his *Theogony* is to establish for himself a double legitimacy. Both self-referential statements are designed to instruct us how to respond to Hesiod's poetic *persona* in the rest of the poem.

5. DIDAXIS

While the post-proemic *Theogony* is replete with evidence of how Hesiod persuades, or rather teaches us of the true nature of the cosmos and god's relation to man (for every word he utters is knowledge that we mortals lack, and is therefore to be considered a form of teaching), the most salient examples of his teaching are the Prometheus and Hekate passages, lines 521–616 and 411–52 respectively. In the Prometheus passage he shows why humans have been made to suffer the ills of mortal existence, while the Hekate passage reveals how we can to some extent alleviate our misfortunes by winning the favor of this willful goddess.

In these two passages Hesiod utilizes the persuasive teaching of a βασιλεύς—βασιλῆες being wise because with their eloquence they can settle disputes and convince aggrieved litigants (89 βλαπτομένοις) to accept fair terms—by explaining how and why the mortal condition came to be the way it is. That is, Hesiod explains why it is that mortals do not dwell on Olympus (hence are ἄγραυλοι, "field-dwelling"), why it is that they are base (κάκ' ἐλέγχεα), and why they are "nothing but stomachs" (γαστέρες οἶον).[30] In the Prometheus passage Hesiod teaches us the reason why all these unfortunate descriptors (from line 26) now apply to the human condition, showing that

[29] Cf. Bakker 2002: 79: "The poet is capable … of 'remembering' the god, which implies both seeing him and accomplishing his presence."

[30] I argue elsewhere (forthcoming) that the Muses' insults in the *Dichterweihe* passage are meant to be applied not to "shepherds" *per se* but to the entire human race, of which the shepherd, who holds the middle position between the gods and the sheep he pastures, is an appropriate symbolic representative. Cf. Vernant (discussed in note below).

Prometheus was the ultimate cause of why humans live apart from the gods, why we merited punishment, and why we are so shamelessly the slaves of our stomachs.[31]

The wretched lot of mortals, who may with some justification regard ourselves as βλαπτόμενοι by the actions of Prometheus and the baleful punishment that they brought down upon us, is nevertheless vastly improved by the intercession of the goddess Hekate. Hesiod employs his divinely persuasive voice in the Hekate passage to convince—or teach—the audience that this benevolent goddess is able, when she wishes, to counteract, to some degree at least, the ill effects that resulted from the Prometheus incident. Hesiod, while informing us how the cosmos came to be in its present shape, thus both teaches us why we are so far below the gods and uses his eloquence to try to convince us to accept the mediation of Hekate as a "just settlement" for our collective grievance. The beautiful poetry in which Hesiod persuades us of this fundamental truth "delights" us, while the settlement that he induces us to accept (i.e., our present unhappy-but-alleviated-by-Hekate mortal status in return for the crime of Prometheus) strikes us as wise and just. Thus Hesiod, with his αὐδὴ θέσπις and his σκῆπτρον, embodies the persuasive functions of both ἀοιδός and βασιλεύς as he describes them in the "Kings and Singers" passage.

6. CONCLUSION

In his presentation in the "Kings and Singers" passage of how βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί perform their functions, Hesiod manipulates our evaluation of each group. In dwelling upon the veneration in which the βασιλεύς is held by the people, and the depth of the pain from which the ἀοιδός can free suffering humanity, Hesiod evokes in us the desired reaction: we, too, are invited to regard the βασιλεύς and the ἀοιδός as awesome manifestations of the Muses' power. If, then, the purpose of this passage is to ascribe both judicial and poetic powers of persuasion to the narrator, it is appropriate that it be presented in a section in which the narrator refers to his own narrative role and offers an explanation of his own text (94 γάρ). For in convincing us of the validity of his judgment that βασιλῆες and ἀοιδοί are divinely eloquent, he has himself employed powerfully persuasive speech. A poet instructs his audience, just as a king instructs the litigants in a court case, by persuading them of the truth (or justice, in the case of the βασιλεύς) of his words. In revealing that he con-

[31] See Vernant for an excellent discussion of the Prometheus passage and how the related functions of eating and sacrifice become at once a defining difference between gods and humans and the only means by which they can henceforth communicate.

siders his own poetic responsibilities to include not only the delectation but also the instruction of his audience, Hesiod employs the very persuasive force that makes possible that delectation and instruction.[32]

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